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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After this case was remanded for a restitution hearing because the State had not
presented sufficient evidence in support of its restitution request (it relied only on the
prosecutor's unsworn oral assertion of the time he spent and his rate of pay), the district
court entered a higher restitution award based on the same information (the
prosecutor's still-unsworn representation, this time, presented in a written document).
Ms. Nelson appeals again, contending that the restitution award in this case should be
vacated

for

several

reasons:

the

restitution

statute

(1.C.

§

37-2732(k))

is

unconstitutional as applied to her; the increased restitution award, which was not based
on new information, constituted vindictive sentencing by the district court; and the State
again failed to meet its burden of proof in the restitution hearing.
The State has not contested one of the points Ms. Nelson raised - that the
restitution award in this case is erroneous because it includes restitution for time spent
solely prosecuting Ms. Nelson's co-defendant on a persistent violator charge; rather, it
simply disputes the proper remedy for that error. (See Resp. Br., p.25 (arguing for an
opportunity to adjust the claim accordingly on remand).)

Based on that apparent

concession, this Court should grant some form of relief in this case.

Thus, the only

question is whether this Court should remand this case at all, and, if it does, whether
and what instructions it should give to the district court about the rules applicable to an
ensuing decision. The State makes several responses to Ms. Nelson's arguments on
these other issues, none of which are meritorious.

1

such, Ms. Nelson maintains that, since the State has already had two
opportunities to meet its burden of proof regarding restitution and has failed to present
any evidence, much less sufficient evidence, in support of its claim for restitution both
times, this Court should not remand this case again. Instead, it should simply vacate
the order for restitution.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. Nelson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred in ordering Ms. Nelson to pay $4,746 in restitution for
prosecution costs in this case.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Ordering Ms. Nelson To Pay $4,746 In Restitution For The
Prosecution Costs In This Case

A.

The Restitution Statute Is Unconstitutional As It Is Applied To Ms. Nelson

1

The State's Attempt To Bar Ms. Nelson's As-Applied Challenge Under The
Law Of The Case Doctrine Misunderstands That Doctrine

Despite focusing its argument on the merits of Ms. Nelson's challenge to the
constitutionality of employing I.C. § 37-2732(k) against her (see Resp. Br., pp.6-10), the
State "questions whether [this] claim is barred by law of the case." (Resp. Br., p.6 n.2.)
The answer to the State's question is, "No, it is not." That answer is based on a proper
understanding of what the law of the case doctrine requires in terms of raising issues
prior to a remand.
As the Idaho Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed, "the law of the case
doctrine 'prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might
have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal."' State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69,
72 (2013) (quoting Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709 (2009) (emphasis added). If the
record in the earlier appeal is insufficient for the party in question to have raised the
issue, then the law of the case doctrine does not prevent that party from raising the
issue for the first time on the ensuing remand. Id.
That is the case here.

The record in the initial appeal was not sufficient for

Ms. Nelson to have raised the constitutional challenge in the initial appeal, primarily
because it had not been preserved to the district court beforehand. That conclusion is
particularly obvious in this case given the fact that, prior to the first appeal, defense
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counsel had asked for an evidentiary hearing to explore the validity of the prosecutor's
unsworn representation at the sentencing hearing, but was denied in that request.

State v. Nelson, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No.387, 2014 WL 708467, p.4 (Ct
App. 2014), rev. denied.

It was at such a hearing that defense counsel would be

expected reasonably to have raised the constitutional challenge, and that is precisely
what happened, when the case was remanded for that hearing.
Since that issue was not raised, nor could it have been effectively raised, in the
initial appeal, the law of the case doctrine does not bar Ms. Nelson from raising the asapplied challenge for the first time on the ensuing remand.

Thus, the issue is

appropriately asserted in this appeal.

2.

The State's Argument As To The Merits Of The As-Applied Challenge
Misunderstands, And So, Misapplies The United States Supreme Court's
Precedent On That Point

Ms. Nelson argues that, pursuant to United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968), ordering her to pay restitution pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(k) is unconstitutional
because it would create the impermissible effect of objectively appearing to punish her
for exercising her rights, and so, chill the exercise of the constitutional right to a trial.

(See App. Br., pp.8-16) The State responds, asserting that the rule in Jackson has not
been embraced by subsequent decisions, and so, no longer constitutes good law.
(Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) The State misunderstands those subsequent decisions.

Jackson clearly remains good law, as the United States Supreme Court
continues to apply it when the facts warrant it. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,
499 n.11 (1999) (reiterating and relying upon the Jackson rule). The State's argument
to the contrary is based

on the analysis in the

5

Ninth

Circuit case,

United

States v. Chavez, 627 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1980). However, the State's argument ignores
details of the Ninth Circuit's analysis.

Those details reveal that Ms. Nelson's as-

applied challenge is actually still a valid argument to raise even under Chavez.

Chavez, like a line of United States Supreme Court decisions before it, simply
recognizes that Jackson does not establish a per se rule of unconstitutionality whenever
a statute impacts the exercise of a constitutional right; rather, those decisions recognize
that application of the Jackson rule depends on the specific facts and statutes at issue
in a particular case.

Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956; see, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439

U.S. 212, 218-19 (1978). Thus, the rule emerges: "not every assertion that a statutory
scheme has chilled the exercise of a constitutional right results in the finding of
unconstitutionality." Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956 (emphasis added).
Ms. Nelson does not actually make any claim to the contrary.

She has not

argued that I.C. § 37-2732(k) could never be constitutionally applied (i.e., made an
argument that it is facially unconstitutional).

(See generally App. Br.)

Rather, she

claims that, based on the unique facts of her case and the particular statute at issue,
I.C. § 37-2732(k) is unconstitutional as it has been applied to her.

(App. Br., pp.15.)

Chavez itself reaffirms that this sort of claim is a proper and viable claim to raise, as it
explains, while there may be legitimate government interests in a statute, such that
costs of prosecution may be authorized "for [another] purpose or effect than to chill the
assertion of constitutional rights

. . .

The question remains, however, whether the

provision is constitutionally infirm because it needlessly encourages the waiver of
constitutional rights." Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956 (emphasis added).

6

Thus, the flaw in the State's argument becomes evident. Those other decisions
rule is no longer good law. Rather, they

not hold that Jackson was wrong, or

distinguished Jackson based on the specific facts and statutes at issue in those
subsequent cases. For example:
[Fuller v. Oregon], the Court said, was fundamentally different from those
decisions which invalidated laws that placed a penalty on the exercise of a
constitutional right [i.e., Jackson]. "Oregon's system for providing counsel
quite clearly does not deprive any defendant of the legal assistance
necessary to meet (their) needs. An indigent's knowledge that he might
someday be required to repay the costs of his legal services in no way
affect his eligibility to obtain counsel
Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956 (quoting Fulmer v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 52 (1974) (emphasis
added). What Fulmer actually stands for, according the Supreme Court itself, is that,
where the statute in question is appropriately tailored to address the government
interests, such that it does not needlessly chill the exercise of the right, the Jackson rule
does not apply. Fulmer, 417 U.S. at 54.
The Jackson rule did not apply in Corbitt for similar reasons: "The Court upheld
the New Jersey statute [at issue in that case] and stated that Jackson did not require
otherwise. 'The principal difference is that the pressures to forgo trial and plead guilty to
the charge [in Corbitt] are not what they were in Jackson."' Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956
(quoting Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 218). Specifically, the Supreme Court explained that, while
the guilty plea process will impact on the trial right, that burden was not "needless"
because the guilty plea still had to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in regard to the
waiver of the trial right Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 219 n.9; see a/so id. at 220-21.
Ms. Nelson's case is more like Jackson than Fulmer and Corbitt because the
effect of enforcing I.C. § 37-2732(k) in this case does directly punish Ms. Nelson's
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choice to exercise her right to a trial.

(See App. Br., pp.13-16.) That is particularly
stand on her rights during the first trial so

from the fact that Ms. Nelson had

that she would not be deprived of a fair trial by the improper presentation of evidence
during the State's case.

(See, e.g., Supp. R., pp.154-55 (documenting the mistrial).)

Despite that fact, the State has now sought and received an order for restitution for the
time the prosecutor spent preparing for and appearing at the second trial. (See, e.g.,
R., pp.38-39 (order for restitution attempting to exclude only the time the prosecutor
spent in court for the first trial, not the time preparing for that trial).) The time to prepare
for and present the second trial was only necessary because the State erred in its first
presentation of the case. Thus, forcing Ms. Nelson to pay the costs of that prosecution
is a needless burden on the exercise of her right to a fair trial. Compare Corbitt, 439
U.S. at 220-21, 219 n.9 (finding the imposition of the burden on the affected right was
narrowly tailored to the purpose and thus, not "needless"); Fulmer. 417 U.S at 54
(same). This is also true as it relates to Ms. Nelson's decision to stand on her right to a
trial in the first place. (App. Br., pp.13-16.)
It is important to remember that the applicable analysis is objective. It considers
whether a reasonable person (which encompasses the perspective of others still
incarcerated), would see the act as a punishment for exercising a constitutional right,
such that they would not exercise that right themselves for fear of being subjected to the
same punishment.

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969) (quoting

Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581-82). Since an objective review of the facts in Ms. Nelson's
case shows she was subjected to higher restitution because of her decision to exercise
her rights to a jury trial and a fair trial, a reasonable person would see the order for
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restitution as punishment against Ms. Nelson for exercising her rights, and, as a result,
reasonable person would not exercise

rights for fear of similar reprisal.

Therefore, as in Jackson, enforcing that statute caused a needless chill upon the
exercise of the rights afforded by the Constitution.

Thus, I.C

§ 37-2732(k) is

unconstitutional as it was applied to Ms. Nelson. (App. Br., pp.8-16.)
As such, the State's arguments against Jackson, which fail to appreciate the
whole body of precedent and the distinctions drawn between the relevant cases, are
erroneous and should be rejected. Based on a proper understanding of precedent, this
Court should vacate the restitution order in this case because ordering it violates
Ms. Nelson's constitutional rights.

B

The District Court's Decision To Order Restitution For A Higher Amount Than
The One Originally Vacated Without New Evidence Affirmatively Appearing in
The Record To Support That Order Was Vindictive
The State makes two arguments in regard to the merits of Ms. Nelson's vindictive

sentencing claim 1: (1) since the district court examined the record to try and understand
its error, its decision was not malicious, and so, was not vindictive; (2) the Pearce
presumption 2 does not apply to the remand in this case, since the point of the initial
remand was to allow for the presentation of new evidence.

(Resp. Br., pp.14-19.)

Neither of these arguments is meritorious, since (1) Ms. Nelson is not required to show
actual vindictive intent or malice by the district court judge to show vindictive

As will be discussed in Section 8(1 )(b), infra, the restitution in this case under this
particular statute qualifies as a punitive consequence of conviction, and so, may be
challenged as vindictive "sentencing."
2 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726 (holding that, if the same court orders a higher sentence on
remand, it is presumed to be vindictive).
1
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, and (2) even though the State had the opportunity to present new evidence,
take advantage of that opportunity.

it

However, it is first necessary to discuss the State's procedural argument in
regard to the whether this claim needs to be analyzed under the fundamental error
standard.

(Resp. Br., pp.12-14.)

This claim is adequately preserved for appeal

pursuant to State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2012), and State v. DuValt, 131
Idaho 550, 553 (1998). However, even if this Court decides otherwise, this claim is not
only cognizable under the fundamental error framework, but Ms. Nelson has met all
three prongs of that test, as well. Either way, this Court should consider the merits of
this claim, and in so doing, vacate the order for restitution in this case.

1.

The Vindictive Sentencing Claim Is Properly Raised In This Appeal

a.

The Vindictive Sentencing Claim Was Adequately Preserved For
Appeal

The State's argument - that the vindictive sentencing claim was not adequately
preserved for appeal (Resp. Br., pp.12-14) - is based on a misunderstanding of the
difference between a claim of vindictive sentencing and vindictive prosecution.

The

State believes that, since Ms. Nelson could have argued the prosecutor's request for
restitution was vindictive, she had an opportunity to raise the question of vindictiveness
generally, and thus, cannot raise the issue of vindictive sentencing by the district court
for the first time on appeal (See Resp. Br., p.12.) That is incorrect.
In fact, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has said, a defendant is "not required to
make a contemporaneous objection to the district court at the time of resentencing to
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afford the district court an opportunity to rebut the Pearce presumption." 3

Id.

The

reason behind that conclusion is: "We agree with the majority of federal circuits, and
specifically with the dissent in Vonsteen[ 4 ], that the Supreme Court's use of the word
'must' in Pearce means that, in imposing a more severe sentence upon remand, the
district court bears the burden to make the reasons for such sentence part of the
record."

Grist, 152 Idaho at 794.

"Otherwise," the Court of Appeals acknowledged,

"Pearce's holding loses its meaning." Id As such, this issue of vindictive sentencing by
the district court is properly presented for the first time on appeal.
The State's assertion that the claim should and could have been presented as a
challenge to the prosecutor's request for restitution also fails to appreciate the
difference between vindictive sentencing and vindictive prosecution. That distinction is
based on the actor whose actions are being challenged:

"Unlike the circumstances

presented fin previous] cases, however, in the situation here the central figure is not the
judge or the jury, but the prosecutor." Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974).
Thus, vindictive sentencing occurs because "due process also requires that a defendant
be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing
judge." Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725 (emphasis added). Contrarily, in vindictive prosecution
claims, it is the prosecutor's charging decisions which are improperly retaliatory. See
Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27-28.

This statement appears to be dicta, as the defendant in Grist had raised his claim of
vindictive sentencing solely under the fundamental error standard, and so, the Court
was only analyzing the claim under the fundamental standard. See Grist, 152 Idaho at
791-95. However, as it is consistent with the majority rule from other courts, and the
Grist Court's rationale regarding the propriety of that rule is sound, this Court should
continue applying that rationale.
4 United States v. Vonsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1094 (5th Cir. 1992).
3
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this case, Ms. Nelson has raised only a vindictive sentencing claim based on
court's restitution order.

(App. Br., pp.1

An argument against the

request for restitution would not have been a sufficient opportunity to
challenge the district court's ensuing actions because, by its nature, a claim of vindictive
sentencing can only be raised after the district court makes a sentencing decision. Until
the district court has made such a decision, there is nothing for the defendant to
challenge or argue about.

Since the defendant has to wait for the district court to

actually render that decision, she will not have a meaningful opportunity to challenge the
district court's decision in the hearing preceding that decision

(See Tr., p.48, Ls.3-6

(the district court indicating that, once the parties briefed the issue, it would consider the
matter fully submitted for its subsequent decision).)

This is precisely why the Idaho

Supreme Court has held a decision by the district court on an issue will preserve that
issue for appeal.

DuValt, 131 Idaho at 553.

Therefore, Ms. Nelson has properly

challenged the district court's restitution decision for the first time on appeal under the

DuValt rationale.
Furthermore, the fact that there are other arguments the defendant might have,
but did not, raise does not mean that the argument she did raise was improper or
incorrect.

Thus, the strawman argument the State identified (and responded to by

calling it a "disingenuous" representation of the facts (Resp. Br., p.13)) is based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the claim Ms. Nelson actually raised. As such, that
strawman argument should be rejected.
Applying the proper analysis, this Court should consider the merits of the issue
Ms. Nelson actually raised as preserved error.
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b.

Alternatively, The Claim Of Vindictive Sentencing In A Restitution
Order May Be Raised As Fundamental Error

Even if this Court determines Ms. Nelson's challenge to vindictive sentencing
was not sufficiently preserved under Grist and DuValt, it can still review that decision as
fundamental error.

See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010) (defining the

fundamental error test).
As an initial matter, the State asserts that, because restitution is a civil
proceeding attendant to the criminal case, Ms. Nelson cannot challenge a restitution
order as fundamental error. (Resp. Br., p.13 (citing State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830,
833 (Ct. App. 2010).) The State's reliance on Mosqueda is misplaced, and Mosqueda
is itself revealed to be an improper decision, because restitution has, and continues to
be, successfully challenged as fundamental error. See, e.g., Grist, 152 Idaho at 791-95
(finding vindictive sentencing constituted fundamental error post-Perry and postMosqueda); State v. Robbins, 123 Idaho 527, 530 (1993) (same, pre-Perry).

Those

decisions are proper because, as the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho Court
of Appeals have recognized, a civil penalty may actually be so punitive as to rise to the
level of criminal punishment. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997)
("Even in those cases where the legislature 'has indicated an intention to establish a
civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either
in purpose or effect, as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a
criminal penalty.") (internal quotations omitted); Buell v. Idaho Dep't of Transportation,
151 Idaho 257, 262 (Ct. App. 2011) (identifying and applying the Hudson factors);
State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 622-23 (Ct. App. 2001) (same).
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As such, contrary to the State's position, the mere fact that restitution occurs in a
does not ipso facto mean that it cannot be reviewed as a criminal
penalty.

Furthermore, the State has not refuted Ms. Nelson's analysis that the

restitution order in this case was so punitive that it rises to the level of criminal
punishment. (See App. Br., pp.9-13; see generally Resp. Br.) Thus, as is uncontested
by the State, the restitution award under I.C. § 37-2732(k), by the plain language of that
statute, establishes a punitive punishment which is subject to vindictive sentencing
analysis. (See App. Br., pp.9-13.) Thus, such a claim may be raised as fundamental
error if it was not adequately preserved below.

See, e.g., Grist, 152 Idaho at 794;

Robbins, 123 Idaho at 530.
That also means the decision in Mosqueda, upon which the State relies in this
regard, is manifestly wrong, since it does not comport with this understanding of the
plain language of I.C. § 37-2732(k). See, e.g. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med.

Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (holding that, if the plain language of the statute, read
as a whole, is clear, the courts are to give effect to the law as written). The State has
made no effort to defend the propriety of the Mosqueda decision in light of these other
decisions, such as the subsequent decision in Buell and Grist. ( Compare App. Br., p.13
n.4 (asserting that Mosqueda should be overruled or recognized as abrogated based on
its inconsistency with these other decisions).) Therefore, in rejecting the State's
argument on this point, this Court should also overrule, or at least recognize as
abrogated, the decision in Mosqueda, as it is manifestly wrong and doing so is
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law set forth by the United States
Supreme Court, which have been recognized and adopted by the Idaho courts. See,
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e.g., Houghland Farms v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77 (1990) (discussing the standard

overruling precedent).
Since restitution under LC. § 37-2732(k) is a punitive consequence of the
conviction, this means that, if this Court decides this issue must be analyzed under the
fundamental error framework, as discussed in depth the Appellant's Brief at page 16,
Ms. Nelson has satisfied the three prongs of that test:

it constitutes a prejudicial

violation of her unwaived constitutional rights clear from the face of the record.

2.

The State's Arguments On The Merits Of The Vindictive Sentencing Claim
Are Erroneous

a.

Since The State Did Not Present New Evidence On Remand, The
Pearce Presumption Of Vindictiveness Applies In This Case

Even if this Court concludes that Ms. Nelson has not shown vindictiveness on the
record, the presumption of vindictiveness, which exists if the same judge imposes a
harsher sentence on remand, applies in this case. See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490
U.S. 794, 798-99 (1989), Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. As it is a presumption of error, the
State bears the burden to prove the presumption inapplicable to the facts of the case.
See Smith, 490 U.S. at 798-99. To meet that burden, the State must show the harsher

sentence is based on new information "affirmatively appear[ing]" in the record before the
district court on remand. See id. at 800-01; Pearce, 395 U.S. at 740.
In that regard, the Smith Court held that presumption does not apply after a new
trial under the common-sense idea that actually having a trial will inevitably present
information that had not been presented during a previous guilty-plea proceeding. See
Smith, 490 U.S. at 801 (1989) ("[T]he relevant sentencing information available to the
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judge after the plea will usually be considerably less than that available after a trial.").
it was because there was sufficient evidence in the record, as a result of the new

evidence actually presented at the trial, which distinguished Smith from Pearce. Id. at
801-02 ("[W]e think there are enough justifications for a heavier second sentence that it
cannot be said to be more likely than not that a judge who imposes one is motivated by
vindictiveness."). Nevertheless, the Smith Court reaffirmed, "any unexplained change in
the sentence is therefore subject to a presumption of vindictiveness." Id. at 802.
As such, this is not a matter of Ms. Nelson wanting the Court to enter the same
order on remand (see Resp. Br., p.16), but rather, it is a demand, supported by United
States Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals' precedent, for the State to have met
its burden in refuting the Pearce presumption by actually presenting new information to
justify the district court's enlarged order for restitution on remand. After all, if the higher
restitution is upheld without such a showing, the rule from Pearce will have no meaning.

Grist, 152 Idaho at 794.
The language in Smith also disproves the State's other argument on this issue that, solely because the case is remanded with the intent for new information to be
presented, Pearce will not apply regardless of what actually happens below.
Resp. Br., pp.16-18.) The State reads Smith too broadly.

(See

The fundamental point in

vindictive sentencing cases is that a harsher sentence must be justified by new
information actually presented to the district court, such that the "the reasons for [the
harsher penalty] must affirmatively appear," in the record.
(emphasis added); cf. Smith, 490 U.S. at 802.

Pearce, 395 U.S. at 740

Thus, the mere possibility that new

information will be presented is insufficient to avoid the Pearce presumption; there must
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actually be information which the district court did not have the first time around
presented on the record.
However, in this case, despite the intent for a more extensive hearing, the
prosecutor did not present any new information in support of the request for restitution
after the remand.

Instead, he presented the same information in a different form.

(Compare R., p.25; with Tr., p.11, Ls.22-23.) In fact, the State concedes the substance

of the prosecutor's request on remand was the same, in that "[t]he amount requested
was the same." (Resp. Br., p.23.) Despite that concession, the State attempts to cast
the prosecutor's repackaged, unsworn request, as "new" information. (See, e.g., Resp.
Br., p.23 ("[O]n remand, the state submitted an exhibit reflecting the basis for the state's
request (Exhibit 1) .... "); Resp. Br., p.18 ("On remand, the only evidence presented
was that the rate [of the prosecutor's pay] is $140.00 per hour. (Exhibit 1.)").)
The fact that prosecutor's representation was presented in a written document
does not, ipso facto, give that representation the same effect as sworn testimony, and
thus, does not make it actual evidence. In such cases, where a claim for restitution is
not based upon actual evidence, such as sworn representations, "the prosecutor's
unsupported representations cannot be relied upon as evidence of the existence of a
contract [for restitution], even under the low evidentiary standards" that exist in
restitution proceedings.

State v. Cheeney, 144 Idaho 294, 299 (Ct. App. 2007)

(rejecting the State's attempt to rely upon the unsworn statement of the purported
victim).

To that point, in Ms. Nelson's first appeal, the Court of Appeals held the

prosecutor's representation was not enough to meet this burden: "The state failed to
present any evidence supporting the amount requested." Nelson 2014 WL 708467, p.3.
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Rather, this is an example of the long-recognized distinction between an
arguments and actual, admissible evidence:
The complaint was countered only by a terse, unverified answer
containing a general denial by the debtor's attorney. The answer alleged
no facts and contained no statement that the denial was based upon the
attorney's personal knowledge of facts in the case. Unswom statements
are entitled to no probative weight in passing on motions for summary
judgment. Moreover, mere denials unaccompanied by facts admissible in
evidence, and affidavits of counsel based upon hearsay rather than upon
personal knowledge are insufficient to raise genuine issues of material
fact.
Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 882 (Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis added). Thus, absent

the prosecutor actually being sworn to the statement, the statement does not have
probative weight, and so, does not constitute evidence in determining whether the State
has met its threshold burden of proof.

See id.

The district court specifically noted

Exhibit 1 was not sworn. (Tr., p.45, Ls.13-14.) Thus, the unsworn statement, despite
being submitted as a written exhibit, does not constitute actual evidence.
Furthermore, the prosecutor's statement said, "I reviewed the time log in this
case," and represented the time his entire office spent on the case based on the time
log. (R., p.25.) Thus, his unsworn statement also is based upon hearsay - what the
time log said based on the entries of an untold number of persons - and so, is further
revealed to not be proper evidence under Camp.

See I.R.E. 801 (c) (defining such

statements as hearsay); Camp, 107 Idaho at 882 (holding that "affidavits of counsel
based upon hearsay rather than upon personal knowledge are insufficient to raise
genuine issues of material fact").

This further reveals the State's assertion that the

prosecutor's statement was evidence to be erroneous.
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In fact, this sort of repackaging of information has been found to be insufficient to
a similar fundamental burden of proof when the party bearing that burden is
required to present new information - motions for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35. When
making such motions, the defendant must support his request with new or additional
information that had not been presented to the district court at sentencing.

State v.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). However, information that was considered at the
sentencing hearing and which is simply repackaged and presented in a different manner
or under a different guise will not satisfy the Huffman standard.

For example, "[t]he

letters from family and friends [the defendant] submitted in support of her Rule 35
motion cannot be truly considered 'new' as they simply purport to provide additional
information as to her mental health, a factor we have already determined adequately
considered by the district court at sentencing." State v. Quintana, 155 Idaho 124, 133
(Ct. App. 2013).

Similarly, "even though not all of this information was specifically

mentioned by trial counsel at the sentencing hearing, [the defendant's] motion
presented no new information for the district court to consider in reducing her
sentences." State v. Halbes/eben, 147 Idaho 161, 170 (Ct. App. 2009).

Thus, just as

the repackaged information in Quintana and Halbesleben was not "new" information
under Huffman, the State's written request for restitution, which reiterated information it
had already presented in regard to its previous request, did not constitute "new"
information which would justify avoidance of the Pearce presumption.
For all those reasons, even though the prosecutor, as an attorney, is expected to
be honest in his representations to the court, his unsworn statement does not constitute
evidence which would support the claim for restitution. See Cheeney, 144 Idaho at 299;
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Camp, 107 Idaho at 882; see also State v. Fernandez, 124 Idaho 381, 383 n.1 (1993)
prosecutor's questioning clearly did not constitute evidence."); cf ICJI 202
(indicating the district court should instruct jurors, as a matter of law, that "[c]ertain
things you have heard and seen are not evidence, including arguments and statements
by lawyers. Lawyers are not witnesses."). Therefore, the fact that the information was
presented in a written document does not make the information therein (the
prosecutor's unsworn assertion of loss) any different than his original, oral, and unsworn
representation.

The State's argument to the contrary only serves to inappropriately

exalt form over substance. Compare, e.g .. State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355 (2003)
(quoting Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235 237 (1969) (reiterating that such arguments are
inappropriate because "'[s]ubstance not form governs'").
This same analysis disproves the State's assertion that, because the district
court considered the transcript of the previous hearing to try and identify its error, there
was new evidence. (See Resp. Br., pp.16. 21.) By its very nature, the information from
a previous hearing is information that was presented to the district court the first time
around. As such, it is not "new" information which could justify an increased sentence,
particularly where, as here, the same judge presided over both hearings. (See Supp.
R., p.244; R., p.24.)

Thus, despite the fact that the State was given the opportunity to present new
evidence on remand, which might have justified a larger restitution order, it did not take
advantage of that opportunity. Therefore, the district court ordered a more significant
amount of restitution based on the same, repackaged information it considered prior to
the first appeal.

Because no new information affirmatively appears in the record to
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justify the district court's harsher restitution order in this case, the Pearce presumption
still applies.

Smith, 490 U.S. at 802 ("[A]ny unexplained change in the sentence is

therefore subject to a presumption of vindictiveness."); Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726 ("[W]e
have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a
defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear."). As
a result, this Court should vacate the restitution order entered in this case based on the
presumption of vindictiveness.

b.

Ms. Nelson Does Not Need To Prove Malicious Intent On The
District Court's Part In Order To Make A Valid Claim Of Actual
Vindictive

Even if this Court determines the Pearce presumption is not applicable in this
case, Ms. Nelson has still shown actual vindictiveness in the district court's actions. To
that point, the State erroneously contends that, to make such a claim, Ms. Nelson would
need to show the district court acted with malice.

(See Resp. Br., p.22 (going on to

argue that, because the district court took the time to review the record to try and
identify its error, its decision on remand was not malicious, and so, did not constitute
vindictive sentencing).)

However, the question of whether there was "actual

vindictiveness" is an objective one: the defendant only needs to show that the district
court's actions, viewed objectively, might cause a reasonable person in the defendant's
situation to fear that a retaliatory motivation existed, and that apprehension would chill
the reasonable person's exercise of a constitutional right.

See, e.g .. Blackledge, 417

U.S. at 28.
Thus, as the United States Supreme Court has made clear: 'The question is not

whether the chilling effect is 'incidental' rather than intentional; the question is whether
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the effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive."

Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582

summarized in Narin v. State, 837 So.2d

(emphasis added). Therefore, as was

519, 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), the term "actual vindictiveness·' is a term of art
indicating that the record actually shows the decision to be vindictive, rather than the
judge acted with malice. (Appellant's Brief, p.18 n.5 (quoting Narin's summary of this
point).) The district court's actions in this case, viewed objectively, have the prohibited
effect, and therefore, are vindictive even if there was no malicious intent on the part of
the district court judge.
Properly applying the objective review standard in this context, the courts look to
the totality of the circumstances to determine if the district court's actions were
vindictive.

See,

e.g.,

State v.

Baker,

153 Idaho 692,

State v. Regester, 106 Idaho 296, 300 (Ct. App. 1986).

695 (Ct. App. 2012);

Because the State fails to

appreciate this proper standard for reviewing a claim of vindictive sentencing, it also
fails to appreciate the point Ms. Nelson made as to one of the relevant circumstances,
namely the district court's statement, "Whenever I got the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals decision, I
looked at it and thought good grief. What was it that I did?" (App. Br., p.19 (quoting Tr.,
p.40, Ls.12-14).) Ms. Nelson has not argued, as the State believes, that this statement
shows the district court was actually malicious, or otherwise proves vindictiveness by
itself. (See Resp. Br., p.22; compare App., Br., p.21 n.21 (acknowledging "[t]he judge's
comments alone do not conclusively prove or disprove an assertion of vindictiveness").)
Rather, she has contended, and continues to contend, that statement speaks to
one of the relevant factors in the totality the circumstances, specifically, whether the
judge imposing the new sentence "ha[s] a stake in the prior conviction or any motivation
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discourage defendants from seeking appellate review." Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27.
district court's statement evidences

desire to make decisions correctly the first

time, and thus, reveals its stake in the upholding the validity of its prior decision.
Compare Colton v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972) (explaining that the court

has a stake in the prior conviction if, on remand, "the court is asked to do over what it
thought it had already done correctly"). Because the district court has an interest in not
having its decisions overturned, and so, not have to "do over what it thought it had
already done correctly," that fact, viewed objectively, indicates the higher restitution
order on remand would discourage such appeals against its orders. As a result, it was
"vindictive," even if the district court had no malicious intent. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at
582 (holding the important consideration is the effect, intentional or otherwise, of the
district court's actions); compare Colton, 407 U.S. at 116-17.
In this regard, it is important to remember that the reason such orders are
prohibited is that the unconstitutional impact is not limited to the defendant at bar, but
extends to other defendants in future cases· "[T]he very threat inherent in the existence
of such a punitive policy would, with respect to those still in prison, serve to 'chill the
exercise of basic constitutional rights."' Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724 (quoting Jackson, 390
U.S. at 581-82).

That is all that is necessary to establish a claim of vindictive

sentencing, and it is what Ms. Nelson has argued in this case. That argument, which is
proper according to several decisions of the United States Supreme Court, is thus, not
the "stretch" the State believes it to be. (Resp. Br., p.16.)
Rather, along with the other relevant factors in this case - such as the fact that
the same judge continued to preside on this matter after remand, and the fact that the
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prosecutor presented the same request for restitution (i.e., no new information) (see
App. Br., pp.16-19 (discussing these

factors in detail)) 5

-

the totality of the

circumstances shows the district court's decision to order a larger award of credit on
remand, viewed objectively, presents a reasonable apprehension that a retaliatory
motivation existed in that order, such that the reasonable apprehension would chill the
exercise of a constitutional right

Therefore, the district court's order for restitution

should be vacated as actually vindictive regardless of whether the district court had
actual malice in entering the higher restitution order.

C.

The State Has Not Met Its Fundamental Burden To Prove Its Actual Economic
Loss Attributable To The Conduct For Which Ms. Nelson Was Convicted,
Meaning The Order For Restitution Is Improper
In regard to the arguments on the merits of the district court's decision, it is

necessary to step back and return to the basic principles of restitution. Fundamentally,
the State bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
actual, economic loss for which it is seeking restitution was caused by the conduct for
which the defendant was actually convicted. See, e.g., State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho
491, 495-96 (Ct. App. 2012). When the State has the opportunity to present sufficient
evidence and fails to meet this burden, the resulting order for restitution should be
vacated.

See, e.g., State v. McNeil, 158 Idaho 280, 286 (Ct. App.2014) (vacating a

5 The State has not challenged Ms. Nelson's arguments in regard to the fact that the
same judge presided over the case on remand. (See generally Resp. Br.) Its
arguments about whether the prosecutor presented the same information and request
for restitution are not persuasive for the reasons discussed in detail in Section B(2)(b),
infra.
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restitution award and not allowing the State another chance to provide sufficient
to prove the award).
The State does not contest Ms. Nelson's claim that the order for restitution in this
case improperly includes restitution for the time the prosecutor spent addressing the
persistent violator charge alleged solely against Ms. Nelson's co-defendant.

(Resp.

Br., p.25 (arguing only about the appropriate remedy for an error in that regard).)
Therefore, regardless of any other arguments, the restitution award in this case should
be vacated because it includes restitution for a loss not attributable the conduct for
which Ms. Nelson was convicted. See Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 495-96. Thus, because
of that apparent concession of error, the only question is whether the case should be
remanded to allow the State a third attempt to meet its burden
The answer is "no" because, unlike the previous appeal, the State had the
opportunity to meet its burden at a hearing, but failed to do so. (See App. Br., pp.32-33
(discussing in depth the precedent revealing this to be the proper remedy in such
situations).) As discussed in depth in Section B(2)(b), supra, the State did not present
any new evidence on remand.

Rather, it repackaged the unsworn statement it had

originally presented. That information has already been determined to be insufficient to
meet the State's fundamental burden of proof by the Court of Appeals. State v. Nelson,
2014 Unpublished Opinion No.387, 2014 WL 708467, p.4 (Ct. App. 2014), rev. denied.
Thus, proper application of the law of the case doctrine means that same information
cannot be used to satisfy the State's fundamental burden of proof on remand. At any
rate, there were two other reasons the information is not sufficient to meet the State's
burden to prove its loss: the information in the prosecutor's unsworn. written statement
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was inaccurate; and, it improperly included time attributable to charges (injury to a child)
which Ms. Nelson was not convicted, and on one charge, actually acquitted. In fact,
restitution for that time was not authorized by the statute even if Ms. Nelson had been
convicted on those charges.

The State's arguments on each of those points is not

persuasive.
Therefore since each of those reasons independently demonstrates why the
State has failed to carry its fundamental burden at the restitution hearing, this Court
should just vacate the restitution award and not remand to allow the State a third bite at
the apple.

1

Proper Application Of The Law Of The Case Doctrine Means The
Repackaged Unsworn Statement Upon Which The State Solely Relied
Below Is Not Sufficient To Support The Restitution Award

The State does not contest Ms. Nelson's argument that, if the restitution order
below were based on the same information the Court of Appeals found insufficient on
the first appeal, the order would violate the law of the case doctrine.
Br., pp.23-24; see generally Resp. Br .. pp.20-26.)

(See App.

Rather, it tries to argue that the

information presented on remand was not the same as the information presented prior
to the first appeal because it presented its request in a written document. 6 (R., p.23.)
However, as discussed in depth in Section B(2)(b), supra, the written statement did not

The prosecutor did argue below that the document presented in Exhibit 1 had been
part of the original presentence materials (PSI), and had been ignored in the initial
appeal. (R., p.27 n.4.) However, that document is not in the PSI included in in the
original record (of which, this Court took judicial notice in this appeal) nor is it in the
addendum to that PSI included with the record in this appeal. (See generally PSI;
Supp. PSI.) Thus, it appears the prosecutor is mistaken about whether Exhibit 1 was
actually part of the PSI.
6

26

constitute new information; it simply repackaged the information that the State
presented the first time around. And even if Exhibit 1 contained new information, it still
failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet the State's fundamental burden of proof for
the reason stated in the Court of Appeals' prior decision in this case. See Nelson, 2014
WL 708467, at p.3.
True, as the State points out, the Court of Appeals held in State v. Weaver that
the prosecutor's certified statement was sufficient to support a restitution award. (See
Resp. Br., pp.20-26 (citing State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 170-71 (Ct. App. 2014)).)
However, the Weaver Court explained the reason the statement was sufficient in that
case was it provided an actual accounting of the time the prosecutor spent working on
that case: "The accounting parsed the prosecutor's time amongst eleven listed tasks
accompanied by a brief description of each task and, in many cases, a date on which
the task occurred."

Weaver, 158 Idaho at 170-71.

In addition. each task was

accompanied by an indication of how many tenths of an hour were spent on the task.

Id. at 170.
Exhibit 1 does not contain those same specific accountings as it does not identify
the separate tasks performed, the date on which they were performed, or the specific
amount of time each task took.

(See generally R., p.25.)

Therefore, this case is

distinguishable from Weaver, and Exhibit 1 is not sufficient to support the request for
restitution.

As such, the information the State presented below was not sufficient to

meet the prosecutor's burden of proof, if it was properly considered at all. Either way,
this Court should vacate the restitution pursuant to the law of the case doctrine and
consistent with the Court of Appeals' previous decision in this case.
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2.

Since The Information In Exhibit 1 Was Not Accurate, It Is Not Sufficient
To Meet The State's Fundamental Burden Of Proof And Support The
Restitution Order In This Case

Since the State bears the ultimate burden of proof, the information it submits
must actually be sufficient to carry that burden. Obviously, if the information it presents
is inaccurate, it will not be sufficient to meet that fundamental burden. In this case, the
only information the State presented in support of the restitution request was the
prosecutor's unsworn written statement of the time spent on this case and his rate of
pay.
Ms. Nelson challenged the reliability of that information below, pointing out that, if
it were reviewed mathematically, it would incorrectly mean the prosecutor's annual
salary was nearly $300,000.

(R., p.33.)

The district court rejected that challenge

because Ms. Nelson had not presented evidence proving the prosecutor's assertion
wrong.

(R., p.40.)

Ms. Nelson contends this improperly shifted the burden of proof.

(App. Br., pp.26-27.)

The State responds, contending the district court acted

appropriately by requiring Ms. Nelson to have presented evidence to contradict the
prosecutor's unsworn representation.

(Resp. Br., pp.24-25.)

The State fails to

appreciate two aspects of challenges to the reliability of evidence which demonstrate its
position is erroneous.
First, it is directly contrary to Court of Appeals' precedent.

As the Court of

Appeals has explained, "[t]here is a distinction between a foundational challenge to the
admission of unreliable evidence and an argument that the evidence which has been
admitted is insufficiently reliable to prove a certain proposition."

State v. Yeoumans,

144 Idaho 871, 873 (Ct. App. 2007). While the former challenge must be preserved by
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a sufficient challenge below, the latter, as a "challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
meet a party's burden of proof requires no specific action or argument below." Id.
of that rule can be seen in State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 695 (Ct. App.
2007), where the victim's affidavit claimed that the defendant had stolen various items.
Id. The defendant argued that, absent an invoice or some other evidence tying those
items to the defendant, the State had failed to carry its burden to prove its claim for
restitution for those items. Id. The defendant did not present any evidence tending to
disprove the victim's affidavit.

See generally id.

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals

agreed with the defendant and reversed the restitution award for those items. Id.
Thus, a defendant may successfully challenge the reliability of the State's
evidence in regard to whether it satisfies the fundamental burden of proof in the
restitution context simply by asserting the State's evidence is insufficient; she does not
need to affirmatively disprove the State's claim for that restitution. See Yeomans, 144
Idaho at 873; Smith, 144 Idaho at 695.

Therefore, even though Ms. Nelson did not

present evidence to prove the prosecutor's actual rate of pay, her argument that the
State had failed to carry its burden to accurately prove the prosecutor's rate of pay was
sufficient to challenge the reliability of the State's evidence. Thus, the State's argument,
like the district court's decision before it, improperly flipped the burden of proof. (See
App. Br., pp.26-27.)
Besides, the State's assertion in that regard is actually inaccurate; there was
information in the documents considered by the district court - notably the transcripts of
the prior discussion on restitution - which disproved the prosecutor's request. At the
first hearing, the district court found, as a matter of fact, that "the loaded benefit rate of
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an Ada County Prosecuting Attorney would come out at about $65 an hour." 7 (Tr., p.29,
That information in the record before the district court supported Ms. Nelson's
contention that the claimed rate of pay

$140 an hour

was inaccurate. Therefore,

there was information supporting Ms. Nelson's prima facie challenge to the reliability of
the prosecutor's statement.

That information, as well as Ms. Nelson's mathematical

challenge, tended to show the prosecutor's request for $140 per hour was artificially
inflated. Thus, the prosecutor, who bore the fundamental burden of proof to show the
State was entitled to the credit it was claiming, bore the burden to present actual
evidence in support of his claim for $140 per hour in this case. Since he did not, nor
has the State tried to justify that claim on appeal (see generally Resp. Br.), the
restitution award based on that claim should be vacated and the State should not be
afforded a third opportunity to try and prove it on remand.
This is particularly true because Ms. Nelson confirmed the validity of her
challenge to the $140-an-hour claim on appeal. Compare Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873
(holding that challenges to the sufficiency of the State's restitution evidence may be
articulated on appeal without a challenge below). According to websites which actually
track the relevant information, the prosecutor's claimed rate of pay was artificially
inflated, as the prosecutor's claim of $140 per hour was five times higher than his actual
rate of pay of $28 per hour. (See App. Br, p.25 (discussing this information in detail).)

Ms. Nelson does not concede the district court's finding of $65 per hour was an
accurate finding, since, as discussed infra, the prosecutor's actual rate of pay (i.e., his
regular salary) was only $28 per hour. (See also App. Br., pp.21-22.) However, the fact
that the district court initially considered $65 an hour to be the accurate rate of pay is
still information tending to disprove the prosecutor's request for a pay rate of $140 an
hour.
7
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Therefore, Ms. Nelson has at least made a sufficient challenge to the reliability of the
prosecutor's statement on appeal, and

Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873.

challenge is properly reviewed on its merits.

The State has made no argument or presented any

evidence contradicting the information identified on appeal. (See generally Resp. Br.)
Thus, remembering that the State continues to bear the fundamental burden of proof in
the restitution context, the restitution award based on that unreliable information
regarding the prosecutor's rate of pay should be vacated.

3.

Since Exhibit 1 Includes Requests For Restitution For Time Spent
Prosecuting Other Charges For Which Ms. Nelson Was Not Convicted,
And Which Would Not Fall Under The Scope Of I.C. § 37-2732(k) Even If
She Had Been, The Restitution Award Based On Exhibit 1 Is Erroneous

The decision in Weaver belies the last of the State's arguments on appeal. The
State attempted to refute Ms. Nelson's claim - that the restitution award was erroneous
because it included time spent on the charges of injury to child for which Ms. Nelson
was never convicted (App. Br., pp.28-30) - by arguing that requiring such an accounting
is "unrealistic." (Resp. Br., p.25.) However, in Weaver, the Court of Appeals stated that
is precisely the sort of accounting a defendant can expect in a restitution proceeding.

Weaver, 158 Idaho at 170-71 ("The state's certified accounting of the time it spent
prosecuting the case, even if only an estimate, constitutes substantial evidence ....

There is little more that Weaver could reasonably expect as evidence in these
circumstances.") (emphasis added).

Therefore, the State's argument is contrary to

precedent.
Furthermore, that sort of accounting is actually required by the plain language of

I. C. § 37-2732(k) because that statute only authorizes restitution for convictions
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resulting "under this chapter" (dealing specifically with controlled substances) and
other, expressly-identified code sections. The injury to child charges alleged in
case do not fall under any of those code sections for which
authorizes restitution

C § 37-2732(k)

(See Supp. R., pp.8-10, 34-35 (identifying the code sections

relevant to the injury to child charges).) Since "[i]t is generally recognized that courts of
criminal jurisdiction have no power or authority to direct reparations or restitution to a
crime victim in the absence of a statutory provision to such effect," restitution for the
time the prosecutor spent on the injury to child charges is improper. State v. Richmond,
137 Idaho 35, 38 (Ct. App. 2002). Thus, restitution for the prosecutor's time spent only
on the injury to child charges was not authorized under the plain language of the
statute, even if Ms. Nelson had been convicted of those charges.

As the Court of

Appeals has aptly summarized in this regard, "when a defendant has been charged with
multiple crimes and pleads guilty to part of the charges in exchange for dismissal of the
remainder, restitution is not ordinarily awardable for loss or injury actually and
proximately caused only by the offenses for which the charges were dismissed."

Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 495-96
For the State to suggest that the courts should ignore the scope of the relevant
statutory authority just because it believes it is "unrealistic" for prosecutors to provide an
accurate accounting of the time they spent prosecuting the offenses specifically
identified in I.C. § 37-2732(k) is wholly improper.

See Verska, 151 Idaho 893, 896

(holding where the statutory language is unambiguous, the courts give effect to the
plain language regardless of potential absurdity of doing so).

Thus, defendants can

properly demand accurate accountings of time spent on these cases, particularly where
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§ 37-2732(k) only authorizes restitution for the time spent prosecuting some of the

charges. See Weaver, 158 Idaho at 170-71, Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 495-96. Since the
restitution award in this case demonstrably includes the time the prosecutor spent on
the injury to child charges (see App. Br., pp.28-30), time for which restitution is not
statutorily-authorized, the State failed to meet its fundamental burden of proof regarding
its request for restitution. Therefore, the order for that restitution should still be vacated.
Since the State has already had two opportunities to meet its burden of proof and
has failed both times, this Court should not remand to give it a third bite at the apple.
(See App. Br., pp.32-33 (discussing in depth the precedent revealing this to be the
proper remedy in cases such as this).)

CONCLUSION
Ms. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order of restitution in
this case.
DATED this 19th day of November, 2015.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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